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1099 
GOOGLE THIS: SEARCH ENGINE RESULTS 
WEAVE A WEB FOR TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS ON THE INTERNET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A curious executive from an established fitness company, Body 
Solutions, runs a search for his company’s web site1 on Google’s search 
engine by inputting the term “Body Solutions” into the query box on the 
Google search page.2 One click later, this executive is dismayed to learn 
that his company’s website, http://www.bodysolutions.com, is not at the 
top of the list.3 In fact, his established company ranks third in the results, 
 
 
 1. This Note intends to explore search engine liability for trademark infringement by using a 
recently filed case as a hypothetical basis. The actual suit, Mark Nutritionals v. AltaVista, was filed in 
U.S. District Court in San Antonio, TX, No. Sao2CV86 (D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2002), available at 
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/pacer/pacer.htm (electronically available through the Texas PACER 
system and copies on file with author). See generally Adlaw By Request, Pay-for-Play Search Engines 
Named in Trademark Suit, at http://www.adlawbyrequest.com (Feb. 11, 2002) (copy on file with 
author); Christopher Saunders, Weight Loss Company Sues Search Engines, at http://www. 
internetnews.com (Feb. 1, 2002) (copy on file with author). Because this Note is more broad-based 
than the Mark Nutritionals suit, only the underlying issue implicating pay-for-play search engines in 
trademark actions is the same. All references to other engines, factual scenarios and broader causes of 
action explored herein are posited only for the author’s goal in discussing the issue and are completely 
separate from the Mark Nutritionals suit.  
 For cross-cultural references purposes, it is illustrative to note that a similar suit has been filed in 
France. In the suit Louis Vuitton SA of France, a unit of LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA of 
France, filed a suit against Google alleging that Google’s pay-for-placement service amounts to 
trademark infringement. Wall Street Journal News Roundup, Google to Purchase Primedia Ad Unit, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, available in Westlaw, 2003 WL-WSJ 3983809. Louis Vuitton argues that 
Google’s practice of returning search results based on which companies and organizations have paid 
for certain keywords is trademark infringement when those keywords are trademarks belonging to 
other entities. Id. This case had not yet been decided at the time of publication of this Note. See also 
infra notes 3 and 5 for further explanation of the Internet and pay-for-placement programs. 
 2. Specifically, the author chose Google as an example because it is the most popular search 
engine with 150 million searches a day. Jefferson Lankford, Search Engine Shootout, 39 ARIZ. ATTY. 
12 (2003). Additionally, Google operates one of the most popular pay-for-placement programs. See 
Google Adwords, at http://adwords.google.com/select (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). 
 3. For resolution of all contemporary trademark infringement actions resulting from activity on 
the Internet, it is necessary to understand the precise parameters of Internet and World Wide Web 
basics, these claims, and the Internet activity at issue. See generally Brookfield Communications, Inc. 
v. West Coast Entm’t, 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the Internet itself is a global 
network of computers that allows individuals, businesses and other organizations to communicate and 
share information, thus enabling many other activities, including commerce. Due to the vast 
commercial opportunities on the Internet, many users (such as individuals, companies, and other 
organizations) have been quick to stake out personal places on the Internet, or their own personal web 
pages. These web pages compile information relating to that particular user and are identifiable on the 
World Wide Web through a domain name address. Id. at 1044. An example of a domain name 
common to many users might be “http://www.yahoo.com.” A domain name consists of a second level 
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after one smaller and less competitive fitness company and one unrelated 
company that services an industry other than fitness. After some 
exploratory conversations with his website designer, marketing team and 
lawyer, this executive learns that Body Solutions, a registered trademark 
in use by his company since 1988,4 has fallen prey to a new economic 
model in use by search engines: pay-for-placement. 
Pay-for-placement is an economic model for competitive Internet 
search systems whereby a company pays for its website to be included in 
the search results for particular search terms.5 As the economics of making 
money on the internet become increasingly difficult to master, search 
engines must employ more aggressive tactics, such as charging for the 
 
 
identifier (e.g., “Yahoo”) followed by a top-level domain (e.g., “.com” or “.edu”) which describes the 
purpose or nature of that particular domain (consider, for example, that “.com” refers to commercial 
enterprises and “.edu” refers to educational institutions). Id.  
 Individual users can connect or “surf” on the World Wide Web through their own personal 
computers. When looking for a specific webpage, these users can either attempt to guess the domain 
name of the page (i.e. when looking for the Nike homepage, a user who does not know the domain 
address may guess by simply typing in “http://www.nike.com” and hope that the resulting page is truly 
that of Nike) or users may opt to use a search engine, such as Google. When a user enters a keyword in 
the search box on Google, “the search engine processes it through a self-created index of web sites to 
generate a (sometimes long) list relating to the entered keyword.” Id. at 1045. In order to generate this 
list, the search engine will use a powerful and sophisticated algorithmic system to scour the Internet 
looking for “keywords in places such as domain names, actual text on the web page, and metatags.” Id. 
Metatags are identifiers written in HTML code (Hypertext Markup Language, or the language of the 
Internet) that are invisible to the human eye but can be read by search engines. 4 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:69 (4th ed. 1998). 
Description and keyword metatags, in particular, are utilized by web site operators to trigger attention 
to that particular site when a user types in specific terms (i.e. to use a broad example, Nike may embed 
metatags such as “basketball shoes” in its site in order to be picked up by a search engine when a user 
inputs the search term “basketball shoes”). A preponderance of descriptive and keyword metatags 
increases a web site’s likelihood of being detected by a search engine because, when the results are 
based on relevancy, “[t]he more often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the web page, 
the more likely it is that the web page will be ‘hit’ in a search for that keyword and the higher on the 
list of ‘hits’ the web page will appear[,]”. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1045 (citing Niton Corp. v. Radiation 
Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. Mass. 1998). Abuse of metatags on a website 
may qualify as “cyberstuffing,” a term used to describe the art of ‘“stuffing”‘ the background of one’s 
website in order to increase one’s showing in a search engine’s relevancy results. J. Thomas 
McCarthy, Trademarks, Cybersquatters and Domain Names, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & 
POL’Y 231 (2000). See infra notes 22, 29-32, 35 and accompanying text for discussions of metatag use 
on websites.  
 4. U.S. Trademark No. 2551134 (renewed Mar. 19, 2002), at http://tess.uspto.gov/bin/ 
showfield?f=doc&state=lmvqi2.3.1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).  
 5. See generally Google Adwords, supra note 1; Overture Advertiser Center, at 
http://www.overture.com/d/USm/adcenter/index.jhtml (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). See also Saul 
Hansell, Paid Placement is Catching on in Web Searches, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2001, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/04/technology/04GOTO.html (copy on file with author). Hansell 
provides the example of a florist who purchases the word “roses” from http://www.goto.com, in order 
to be included when a user conducts a search for that term. Id. As Hansell found, the higher the fee 
paid for the search term, the higher that florist’s website would appear in the search results. Id. 
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actual term, to ensure a profit. Although brokering trademarked terms to 
competitors may seem facially unfair, search engines claim no foul play 
because if an engine learns it has sold a trademarked keyword, it will 
simply remove the infringing material.6
Pay-for-placement search engine listings challenge common 
perceptions of results lists by returning results primarily based on who has 
paid for a listing rather than on relevance.7 To that end, these economic 
models have garnered suspicion and criticism from trademark owners, 
search engine monitors, lawyers and the Federal Trade Commission.8  
 
 
 6. See Stephanie Olsen, Web Sites Prey on Rivals’ Stores, at http://news.com.com/2102-
1023_3-271196.html?tag=st_util_print (Aug. 7, 2001) (copy on file with author). Olsen writes: 
“Excite@Home sells advertising space ‘keyed’ to trademark company names, but said ‘if there are 
objections (from owners of that name), we take the ad down,’ according to John Sullivan, associate 
general counsel at Excite@Home.” Id. Although potential infringement incited by the actions of a 
search engine or other Internet Service Provider (ISP) can easily be rectified by removing the 
infringing materials, consider how such censorship implicates a socially unacceptable level of chilling 
across the board. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 27, 38 (2001). In the context of 
copyrighted materials where an ISP responded to a cease-and-desist letter by removing all of the 
potentially infringing materials, including those protected under fair use laws, Vaidhyanathan suggests 
that cease-and-desist letters wield a vast amount of social control and can effectively chill or 
completely censor the free expression of ideas, Id.  
 Overture claims to police the problem before it materializes by only selling trademarked keywords 
to advertisers that (a) “refer[] to the trademark or its owner or related product in a permissible 
nominative manner without creating a likelihood of consumer confusion,” or (b) “use[] the term in a 
generic or merely descriptive manner.” Overture—Information on Trademarks as Search Terms, at 
http://www.overture.com/d/USm/about/company/trademarkinfo.jhtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).  
 7. See GoTo.com v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, GoTo 
operated a web site containing a “pay-for-placement search engine, which allow[ed] consumers to 
locate items on the Web using a search algorithm weighted in favor of those advertisers who have 
[had] to have their products given a priority by the engine.” Id. Under a traditional search engine set-
up, the engine would provide results generated from an algorithm focused on relevancy. See supra 
note 3. 
 8. This Note will explore the concerns of valid trademark holders who consider their trademark 
rights at risk due to the sales agendas of search engine operators who sell trademarked terms to junior 
users and competitors for commercial use. There are other criticisms of pay-for-placement beyond the 
scope of this Note. See generally http://www.searchenginewatch.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2002). 
Danny Sullivan, editor of SearchEngineWatch.com, suggests that the pay-for-placement model of 
search engines has suffered challenges from those who consider paid results to be less useful and 
ethical than those results lists traditionally based on relevancy algorithms. Id. See also Saul Hansell, 
Paid Placement is Catching on in Web Searches, supra note 5. In fact, these complaints inspired 
Commercial Alert, an online consumer protection organization, to file a deceptive advertising 
complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Commercial Alert, Commercial Alert Files 
Complaint Against Search Engines for Deceptive Ads, at http://www.commercialalert.org (July 16, 
2001) (copy on file with author). The complaint asserted that the inclusion of paid advertisements in 
search results makes the advertisements “look like information from an objective database selected by 
an objective algorithm[]” when “really they are paid ads in disguise.” Id. Commercial Alert argued that 
pay-for-placement is a consumer protection issue because failure to disclose that an advertisement is 
an advertisement will influence consumers’ purchasing decisions. Id. This argument likens search 
engines’ use of pay-for-placement to infomercials that pose as in-depth, objective programming, which 
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This Note focuses on search engines’ potential liability for trademark 
infringement, including: (1) direct trademark infringement,9 (2) 
contributory trademark infringement,10 and (3) tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage.11 In Part II, this Note presents the history 
of trademark infringement relevant to an Internet dispute. In Part III, this 
Note analyzes the history to predict the most viable claims for a company 
such as Body Solutions. In Part IV, this Note provides a concrete proposal 
utilizing that analysis. This Note argues that (1) because a search engine is 
not the vehicle for direct trademark infringement, it cannot be held liable 
for publishing potentially infringing results nor for the initial interest 
confusion generated from those listings; (2) when a search engine sells a 
trademarked search term to one whom it knows will use it in an infringing 
manner, the search engine may be held liable for contributory trademark 
infringement; and (3) because it is unlikely that an Internet plaintiff can 
prove a likelihood of potential business relationships with consumers who 
might be deterred through improper publishing of the plaintiff’s 
trademark, a search engine will not be found liable for tortious interference 
with prospective economic advantage. 
 
 
the FTC has taken action against in the past. See Michael S. Levey et al., Proposed Consent Agreement 
with Analysis to Aid Public Comment, 58 Fed. Reg. 38764-03 (July 20, 1993). The Commercial Alert 
letter concluded by asking the FTC to investigate whether specific search engines were violating 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”). Commercial Alert, supra. The FTC Act 
prohibits unfair or deceptive advertising that impedes commerce by misleading reasonable consumers. 
15 U.S.C. § 45a(1) (1994). Professor McCarthy also asserts that “a user can no longer trust the 
objectivity of the rankings presented by such search engines.” 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY 
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:70.1, at 25-166 (4th ed. 1998). The FTC’s Bureau 
of Consumer Protection responded to the Commercial Alert complaint by issuing a letter to eight 
search engines recommending that these sites more appropriately conform to FTC regulations by 
putting consumers on notice as to the advertisements in the search results, conspicuously explaining 
the use of paid advertising in search results and not making any affirmative statements likely to 
mislead consumers as to the basis of a search result. Letter from the FTC to Eight Search Engines, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertattach.htm (June 27, 2002).  
 9. See infra §§ II(A)(a) and III(A) (discussion of direct trademark infringement actions 
involving search engines and the Internet).  
 10. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (defining the fundamental terms of contributory 
trademark infringement).  
 11. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining the rule for tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage). Increasingly, courts may be resorting to traditional causes of action 
to instill further protection of intellectual property on the Internet. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to 
Repeat the Past: the Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of 
Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401 (1997). Keller suggests: “[r]esort to common law 
theories for protection of developing technologies is not a new phenomenon, but has occurred 
throughout the twentieth century at times when technology outpaced the development of the law.” Id. 
at 406. 
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II. HISTORY 
A. Trademark Infringement on the Internet 
Advances in technology, including but not limited to the Internet, have 
challenged and expanded traditional notions of trademark protection.12 
Although the law of protection for trademark owners may be evolving 
with the advances in technology, the underlying policy goals behind 
protection remain very much the same.13 As the forum for potential 
trademark infringement changes, the court is entitled to create new 
remedies to match the needs of the new situation.14  
 
 
 12. Consider the basic roots of intellectual property protection: “the rules of unfair competition 
are based, not alone upon the protection of a property right existing in the complainants, but also upon 
the right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit.” Am. Philatelic Soc’y v. Claibourne, 46 
P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (citing Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925)). 
In the Internet context, trademark infringement can take many forms, including when two independent 
enterprises each obtain their own web sites and soon begin to compete. Eventually, one of the 
competitors may claim trademark infringement through unfair use of the mark on the Internet. Often 
these claims have been between competing domain names. JANE GINSBURG, DAVID GOLDBERG, & 
ARTHUR GREENBAUM, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 799-806 (Foundation Press) (1991). 
However, the pay-for-placement scheme poses a new set of issues for the courtroom. As the Niton 
court opined: “[t]his is a classic illustration of a new kind of litigation for which nothing in past 
experience comes even close to preparing trial judges and the advocates appearing before them.” 27 F. 
Supp. 2d at 103, supra note 3. 
 13. The absolute purpose of trademark law has remained unaltered: “[i]dentification of the 
manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a service.” New Kids On the Block v. News Am. 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992). The New Kids court further notes that Lanham Act 
protection has remained faithfully committed to the underlying notion that an infringer of a trademark 
should not be allowed to unfairly compete by “capitaliz[ing] on the investment of time, money and 
resources of his competitor.” Id. The court found that trademark law both engenders and protects 
competition by “guard[ing] against the overuse of resources while also providing incentives for the 
creation of new combinations of resources.” Id. at 306 n.3.  
 A 1996 amendment to Section 43 of the Lanham Act changed some of the goals of trademark 
protection with regard to the dilution of famous marks. The amendment, the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act, does not require proof of a traditional likelihood of confusion test for famous marks, 
instead allowing for a cause of action when a famous mark has been diluted. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) 
(1996). Dilution of a famous or distinctive mark under the Act occurs when there is “a sufficient 
similarity of marks to evoke in consumers a mental association of the two” and that similarity “causes 
actual harm to the senior marks’ economic value as a product-identifying and advertising agent.” 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah, 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(internal numbering omitted).
 14. American Philatelic, 46 P.2d at 140. The Court succinctly posits: 
When a scheme is evolved which on its face violates the fundamental rules of honesty and 
fair dealing, a court of equity is not impotent to frustrate its consummation because the 
scheme is an original one. There is a maxim as old as law that there can be no right without a 
remedy, and in searching for a precise precedent, an equity court must not lose sight, not only 
of its power, but of its duty to arrive at a just solution of the problem. 
Id. See also Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“[w]e must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when 
applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach”).  
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1. Direct Trademark Infringement 
Traditionally, trademark infringement exists when improper use of a 
trademark results in likelihood of confusion for consumers.15 In an early 
decision exploring the potential for trademark infringement in the Internet 
setting, the court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc. held 
that a domain name registrar could not be held liable for infringement 
when it published a list of registered domain names.16 The court reasoned 
that the registrar’s involvement with the trademarks did not qualify as 
trademark infringement because the published “list is not the instrument or 
forum for infringement.”17
In the search engine context, trademark infringement actions have 
traditionally focused on whether or not a search engine’s use of 
trademarked terms in its search results constitutes trademark 
 
 
 15. At common law, this test requires the infringing mark to “be identical with or confusingly 
similar to the [plaintiff’s] trade name.” See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 717 (1938). As codified 
in federal law at § 32 of the Lanham Act, infringing conduct occurs when the defendant uses “any 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation” of the plaintiff’s registered mark in sale of the 
defendant’s goods, when “such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 
U.S.C.A § 1114 (1946). See also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). In a 
decision that has since been widely adopted, the Ninth Circuit elucidated on the standard “likelihood 
of confusion” analysis used in trademark infringement actions by introducing eight factors that the 
Court considered relevant in determining whether likelihood of confusion exists between related 
goods: (1) the strength of the mark, (2) the proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4) 
evidence of actual confusion, (5) the marketing channels used, (6) the type of goods and the degree of 
care likely to be exercised by a purchaser, (7) the alleged infringer’s intent in selecting the mark, and 
(8) the likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id. at 348-49. 
 16. 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) The court found that a 
registrar of Internet domain names could not be held liable for trademark infringement or contributory 
trademark infringement as a printer or publisher of the trademark. The court held that the registrar did 
not use the mark in connection with the sale of goods nor did the registrar know or have reason to 
know that the mark was being infringed by similar domain names. Id. at 960-62. 
 17. Id. at 958. The Ninth Circuit’s holding with regard to registrar liability is consistent with 
prior courts’ handling of vanity telephone numbers; that mere possession of a particular phone number 
or domain name, without more, cannot be trademark infringement. Id. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 
Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit found that although telephone 
numbers can be registered as trademarks and a competitor’s use of a confusingly similar telephone 
number may be enjoined, the defendant would have to do more; that is, promote the number in 
conjunction with the trademark in order to amount to an infringement. Id. at 624. In Holiday Inns, the 
court held that the defendant used the number only as a telephone number and not as a trademark. Id. 
at 625-26. But cf. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. R.M. Post, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
The Century 21 court found that the actions of a yellow pages publisher were enjoinable under the 
Lanham Act when the publisher allegedly printed an infringing trademark. Id. at 1617. The Lockheed 
court distinguished its decision by noting that the yellow pages publisher supplied the actual material 
that incited the likelihood of confusion whereas registering domain names, as Network Solutions did, 
does not itself infringe on a mark. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 957 (citing Century 21, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1617). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/6
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infringement.18 However, these actions have turned on the “fair use” 
defense classically elucidated by New Kids On the Block v. News America 
Publishing, Inc., whereby a defendant cannot be held liable when he is not 
using the plaintiff’s mark as his own trademark,19 as would be the case 
when the defendant is returning the term in a results list.20 Moreover, if the 
term is otherwise part of the English language, the defendant may have a 
valid reason for using it.21
A vast number of recent trademark infringement cases resulting from 
Internet activity have arisen due to the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
trademarked terms in the metatags of the defendant’s web page.22 Rather 
 
 
 18. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Excite, No. SACV 99-320 AHS EEX, 2000 WL 1308815 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000). Playboy claimed that the Defendant, search engine “Excite,” infringed on Playboy’s 
trademarks by returning Playboy’s trademarked terms in search results, thus using the terms in 
commerce in such a way as to cause a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the goods or 
products. Id. at *1. The court resolved this issue in favor of Excite, citing a fair-use defense. Id. See 
infra note 19.  
 19. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). The New 
Kids court held that if a trademark owner were granted “exclusive rights” in the use of the trademarked 
words, “the language would be depleted in much the same way as if generic words were protectable.” 
Id. at 306. Granting such exclusive rights would, essentially, entitle trademark owners to appropriate 
words from use by society at large. Id. In order to protect the interests of society in word usage and the 
interests of the trademark owner, courts will generally balance competing interests by holding that 
“[w]hen a trademark comes to describe a class of goods rather than an individual product, . . . as a 
matter of law that use of that mark does not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product by the 
original holder.” Id. In fact, it would be virtually impossible to describe certain classes of goods for 
comparative, critical or referential purposes without using the trademarked terms. Id. Other courts 
have adopted this test in the Internet context to find that “nominative use” of the trademarked term 
simply cannot compel a finding of liability. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. See also 
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court in Welles rightly found 
that Welles’ use of the trademarked term “Playmate of the Year 1981” on her personal webpage 
should be excepted from liability: 
[T]here is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her services 
without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself as “the nude model 
selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one prototypical woman for the year 1981” 
would be impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying Terri Welles to the public. 
Id. (quoting PEI v. Welles, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 1999).  
 20. See Playboy Enters. v. Excite, 2000 WL 1308815 at *1. The court found that in the search 
results “[d]efendants do not use PEII’s trademarks qua trademarks. Although PEII uses its trademarks 
to identify its goods and services, defendants do not.” Id. 
 21. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (C.D. 
Cal. 1999) (“The holder of a trademark may not remove a word from the English language merely by 
acquiring trademark rights to it.”) (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065; Bada Co. v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970)): 
The law is that a word which is in its primary meaning merely descriptive of the goods to 
which it is applied may not be appropriated as the exclusive trademark of a single seller, since 
one competitor will not be permitted to impoverish the language of commerce by preventing 
his fellows from fairly describing their own goods. 
 22. Id. at 11. See Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. 
Mass. 1998). See also supra note 3 for a discussion of metatags and their purposes. In Niton, the 
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than finding infringement based on a proven likelihood of confusion, in 
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Co., the 
Ninth Circuit actually stopped short of the likelihood of confusion test, 
holding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark in its web 
pages will result in “initial interest confusion.”23 That is, the test for 
trademark infringement may be met when “‘potential consumers initially 
are attracted to the junior user’s mark by virtue of its similarity to the 
senior user’s mark, even though these consumers are not actually confused 
at the time of purchase.’”24 Courts adopting this doctrine require that the 
defendant have used allegedly infringing metatags with intent to divert 
users seeking information on the Internet.25 Notably, courts are willing to 
measure a defendant’s intent by the profit he makes from using the 
trademark terms, a qualifier suggesting that the defendant “inten[ded] to 
capitalize on the plaintiff[’s] mark . . . .”26 Although any potential user will 
immediately realize that he is not at the plaintiff’s site (where he intended 
to go) and thus, there is no likelihood of actual confusion, the trademark 
infringement still enables the defendant to at least initially divert the user, 
thereby impeding Internet traffic to the plaintiff’s site.27  
Initial interest confusion analysis has suffered sharp criticism by courts 
more reluctant to apply it to the Internet setting.28 At least one district 
 
 
plaintiff successfully showed that the defendant was unfairly embedding the plaintiff’s trademarks in 
metatags on the defendant’s web site, in order to increase the defendant’s likelihood of a high listing in 
a return of search results generated by a search engine, thus contravening plaintiff’s business. Niton, 
27 F. Supp. 2d at 104. Some courts have concluded that the defendant’s bad faith in using the 
plaintiff’s trademark in the defendant’s metatags is probative of likelihood of confusion. See New 
York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). “Likelihood of confusion” is the standard trademark infringement test, measured by 
a variety of factors. See generally Sleekcraft Boats, supra note 15.  
 23. 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 3.  
 24. Id. at 1064 (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993)). See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(Initial interest confusion is actionable under Lanham Act § 43(a) when a “consumer is lured to a 
product by its similarity to a known mark, even though the consumer realizes the true identity and 
origin of the product before consummating a purchase”); J.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Although HTML code is not visible to consumers and, therefore, is not 
likely to cause customer confusion, the use of trademarked terms in a website’s hidden code ‘will still 
result in what is known as initial interest confusion.’”) (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062).  
 25. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 465. In fact, when search engines use trademarked terms in their search 
results, it is critical to note that, often, those engines “do not use these words to identify any goods or 
services and have no intent to do so, much less an intent to confuse consumers.” Playboy Enters., Inc. 
v. Netscape Communications, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1085 (C.D Cal. 1999).  
 26. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 852 (N.D. Ill. 1980)) (brackets in 
original). 
 27. See Harris, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1125. 
 28. See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) In part, the court found that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss4/6
p1099 Padawer book pages.doc  3/12/2004    
 
 
 
 
 
2003] GOOGLE THIS 1107 
 
 
 
 
court has found that the policy issues guiding adoption of initial interest 
confusion29 simply are not at play in the Internet context, when the 
defendant embeds the plaintiff’s trademarks in metatags on the 
defendant’s site to divert traffic from the plaintiff’s site.30 The Bihari v. 
Gross court notes that on the information superhighway, rather than the 
physical highway that the Brookfield court offers in its analysis, it is 
relatively simple “[w]ith one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay, a 
viewr can return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for 
the original website.”31 The lack of time delay, argues the court, serves as 
a buffer protecting the defendant’s fair use of the allegedly infringing 
metatags and, further, allows the user to maintain personal efficiency in 
his Internet searches.32
 
 
when the defendant embedded the plaintiff’s trademark in metatags on the defendant’s site in order to 
divert traffic from the plaintiff’s site, there was no likelihood of confusion. Id. at 318-19. 
 29. For a discussion of the various policy concerns prevalent in cases of this nature, see 
Brookfield, where the court considered the loss of efficiency a user suffers when his web searches are 
unnecessarily diverted. 174 F.3d at 1064. Additionally, the court found that a defendant who uses a 
competitor’s trademarks in his metatags “misappropriat[es] [the plaintiff’s] acquired good will.” Id. 
See also Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002) (“by Equitrac’s placing 
the term Copitrack in its metatag, consumers are diverted to its website and Equitrac reaps the 
goodwill Promatek developed in the Copitrak mark”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (“If the law does not 
prevent it, free riding will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark, and the 
prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark in the 
first place”).  
 30. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 320. In Brookfield, the court posited a hypothetical metaphor to 
explain the harms of initial interest confusion in cyberspace. 174 F.3d at 1064. In this metaphor 
featuring a highway with users as the drivers of cars, a user might pass a billboard featuring an 
advertisement for “Company A” (the plaintiff) and get off the highway intending to visit Company A’s 
store. Id. However, when the user pulls off the highway at the exit, he cannot find Company A’s store 
anywhere, but he does see a store for “Company B” (the defendant). Id. Although the user understands 
that he is not at the store of Company A, where he intended to go, he very well might just visit 
Company B instead, assuming the two companies provide a similar product or service. Id. In the 
Brookfield hypothetical, the two competing enterprises were both video stores. Id. The Brookfield 
court used this example to illustrate the overriding policy concerns of efficiency and economy. Id. Due 
to the time it would take to get back on the highway and find Company A’s store, the user simply may 
choose to rent or purchase from Company B. Id. As a result, Company A suffers even though no actual 
confusion resulted from the scenario. Id. 
 31. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 320 n.15. Unlike the physical highway example, the Bihari court 
continues, inserting the plaintiff’s trademarked term in the metatags of the defendant’s web site is “not 
akin to a misleading ‘billboard[]’” and does not “‘misappropriat[e] [plaintiff’s] acquired goodwill.’” 
Id. at 320. (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064). See also Jonathon H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, 
Note, Gore, Gibson and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 274 (2002) (“The information superhighway is not like a regular highway. 
Its links are not like roads signs, for that conception ignores the instantaneity of the Internet . . . .”).  
 32. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 320. The court cautions that “[a] broad rule prohibiting the use of 
[trademark in] metatags . . . would effectively foreclose all discourse and comment . . . including fair 
comment.” Id. at 323. 
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Court holdings that allow defendants to use trademarked terms in their 
web site’s metatags and on the actual web site serve two interests. First, 
these decisions protect those individuals who seek to criticize or compare 
services with a well-known trademark holder.33 Second, these decisions 
protect defendants for whom no other language exists to describe their 
services except a well-known trademark, thus preventing trademark 
holders from monopolizing certain words.34 However, in all cases, the 
decision protecting metatag use of trademark terms has been extremely 
fact-specific.35 The favorable protection for trademarks in metatags has 
been limited to those situations when the search engines return results 
based on algorithmic relevancy, which would qualify as nominative use 
under the New Kids test.36  
Although pay-for-placement has not been heavily litigated,37 one of the 
few cases raising the issue in peripheral terms, Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan 
Computer Corp. (“Nissan II”), held that the plaintiff could purchase a 
trademarked search term from a search engine or embed the trademarked 
terms in the metatags of its site if (1) the plaintiff had a legitimate 
commercial interest in the trademarked term, and (2) the plaintiff and 
defendant were not in direct competition.38 The court found that despite 
 
 
 33. See supra note 24. T.K. Harris & Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2003) 
(citing Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 804 (9th Cir. 2002)). For a discussion of policy 
interests in allowing competitors to use trademarked terms outside the Internet context, see also Smith 
v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (where the court found that use of trademark terms 
in a competitor’s advertising was necessary in order to stimulate competition and protect the 
consumer’s interest in being able to make comparative purchasing decisions).  
 34. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 35. See, e.g., Welles, 279 F.3d at 804 (the “decision might differ if the metatags listed the 
trademarked term so repeatedly that Welles’ site would regularly appear above PEI’s in searches for 
one of the trademarked terms”).  
 36. See Welles, 279 F.3d 796, supra note 18; Playboy Enters. v. Excite, 2000 WL 1308815 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000). For a discussion of the New Kids test and fair or nominative use standards, see supra notes 
18-19 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the methods used by search engines to return 
search results, see supra note 3.  
 37. See generally TRADEMARK LAW & THE INTERNET 359 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield, 
eds., International Trademark Association 2d ed. 2001) (with most cases on search engines’ sale of 
keywords settled out of court, “[t]rademark attorneys eagerly await a final decision on the keyword 
issue”). See also supra note 5 (explaning of the pay-for-placement model adopted by many successful 
search engines).  
 38. 204 F.R.D. 460 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Nissan II]. The Nissan II court dealt with an 
issue of first impression: whether or not a plaintiff’s purchase of its own trademark attached to a 
“.com” identifier as a search term for the sheer purpose of manipulating a search engine’s results was 
tortious when the defendant, in fact, owned the rights to the domain name bearing the trademarked 
term. Id. To clarify, Uzi Nissan has owned a computer retailing store known as “Nissan Computer 
Corporation” since 1991 and has used his surname in connection with a variety of businesses since 
1980. Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp. (“Nissen I”), 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (C.D. Cal. 
2000), aff’d Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000). As per his 
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having registered the sites and maintaining proprietary control over the 
sites’ content, the defendant did not have exclusive rights to the terms 
“nissan.com” and “nissan.net” because “the purpose[] of intellectual 
property law is to determine ‘not only what is protected, but also what is 
free for all to use.’”39 To that end, the court affirmed the notion that simply 
registering a website does not trump traditional trademark law.40 In very 
important dicta however, the Nissan II court suggested that there should be 
liability for trademark infringement when a competitor improperly 
purchases a trademarked search term for purposes of manipulating search 
results when in direct competition with the trademark holder.41
 
 
commercial interests, Mr. Nissan registered the domain names “http://www.nissan.com” and 
“http://www.nissan.net.” Id. In an earlier civil action, Mr. Nissan was found to have a legitimate 
commercial interest in the domain names but some of his more unfair tactics, such as displaying a 
computer logo allegedly extremely similar to the plaintiff’s trademarked logo for its line of 
automobiles, were ordered removed from the websites. Id. at 1162-65. Additionally, the court ordered 
Mr. Nissan to post an identifying caption at the top of his pages, directing potential Nissan Motors 
customers to the Nissan Motors website, “http://www.nissandriven.com.” Id. at 1165. Nissan Motors 
filed the Nissan II suit alleging trademark dilution, trademark infringement, domain name piracy, false 
designation of origin and state law unfair competition. Nissan II, 204 F.R.D. at 461. Mr. Nissan 
counter-claimed, alleging, among other things, reverse domain name hijacking, interference with 
prospective economic advantage, unfair competition and unjust enrichment, on account of the plaintiff 
having purchased the terms “nissan.com” and “nissan.net” from various Internet search engine 
operators. Id. at 461-62. The hard-hitting effect of the plaintiff’s move to purchase these terms was the 
successful manipulation of search results: by buying specific terms from search engines, Nissan 
Motors guaranteed itself a higher listing in the search results, thus potentially contravening Nissan 
Computer traffic from “nissan.com” and redirecting users to “nissandriven.com.” Mr. Nissan claimed 
these tactics “wrongfully re-directed” users, that users would believe Nissan Computers was insolvent 
and that “Nissan Computer will lose customers and suffer irreparable damage to its goodwill.” Id. at 
463-64 (citing Proposed SAA ¶¶ 136-37). To buttress his position, Mr. Nissan gave an example from 
the search engine GoTo (http://www.goto.com), where the search results returned a “quick hit” touting 
Nissan North America (an offshoot of Plaintiff’s Nissan Motors Corporation) as the official 
“nissan.com” website. Id. at 464 (citing Def’s Supplemental Br. Re: Search Terms at 2:25-3:1).  
 39. Nissan II, 304 F.R.D. at 465 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 151 (1989)). The Nissan II court drew authority from scholarly sources as well, finding that 
“[i]ntellectual property is a deliberate, government-sponsored departure from the principles of free 
competition, designed to subsidize creators and therefore to induce more creation.” Id. (quoting Mark 
A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law & Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. 
REV. 111, 170 (1999)).  
 40. Id. at 465 (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066). 
 41. Id. at 466. On the facts of Nissan II, such a holding would undermine the plaintiff’s valid and 
protectable interest in the terms “nissan.com” and “nissan.net.” Id. The court draws authority from a 
line of cases holding that improper use of metatags to manipulate search results compelled a finding of 
liability for trademark infringement. Id. (citing Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1066-67; Nettis Envtl. Ltd. v. 
IWI, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, 
Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 105 (Mass. 1998)). See also supra notes 2 and 21 and accompanying text 
(discussing metatag use, both proper and improper).  
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2. Contributory Trademark Infringement 
The prevailing standard for determining when contributory 
infringement has occurred in instances of manufacturer or distributor 
trademark infringement requires one of two threshold levels established in 
Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. (“Inwood III”) to be 
met.42 It either a manufacturer or distributor (1) “intentionally induces 
another to infringe a trademark,” or (2) “continues to supply its product to 
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement,” a court is entitled to find the manufacturer or distributor 
liable for contributory trademark infringement.43 In this landmark 
decision, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion broadly construed prior 
limitations on trademark infringement liability by noting that a 
manufacturer who “does not directly control others in the chain of 
distribution[]” can still be held liable for the actions of those further down 
the line.44 However, the Court was explicit in noting that its finding of 
contributory infringement was fact-specific.45 The Court found that the 
legal test for contributory infringement, as inferred from § 32 of the 
Lanham Act46 and refined by the First Circuit,47 had been met when the 
 
 
 42. 456 U.S. 854, 858 (1982) The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s finding of a 
violation of the Lanham Act § 32, noting that the appellate court erred in setting aside findings of fact 
that were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 858. For a comparison of the various findings of the district and 
appellate courts in this case, see infra note 48.  
 43. Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 854 (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. at 853-54. For a discussion of the standard test used in direct trademark infringement 
issues, see supra note 15. 
 45. Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 854. The court found a manufacturer liable for contributory 
infringement only “under certain circumstances.” Id. 
 46. The Lanham Act imposes liability on any person who shall: 
reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such 
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, 
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on 
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(b) (1946) (amended 1988). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 26(2), at Reporter’s Note, cmt. a (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(b)). But cf. John T. 
Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability for Trademark 
Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101. Cross suggests: 
Contributory infringement clearly falls outside the explicit wording of the Lanham Act. 
Because both § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), only apply to those who use the plaintiff’s mark, they 
cannot, by definition, apply to a defendant who did not use the mark.  
Id. at 110 n.33. 
 Arguably, because § 32 of the Lanham Act has no built-in contributory infringment standard, 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion may have created room for contributory trademark infringement 
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petitioners continued to enable the sales of a product when they “knew or 
had reason to know” infringing practices were occurring.48 The Court 
cautioned that obviously intentional trademark infringement subverts the 
 
 
by way of analogy to the statutory contributory infringement standard in patent law. See 35 U.S.C.A. 
§ 271(c) (1952) (“Whoever offers to sell . . . a component of a patented machine . . . knowing the same 
to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent . . . shall be liable 
as a contributory infringer.”).  
 47. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946), aff’d 162 
F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947). The court found that “[b]efore he can himself be held as a wrongdoer or 
contributory infringer one who supplies another with the instruments by which that other commits a 
tort, must be shown to have knowledge that the other will or can reasonably be expected to commit a 
tort with the supplied instrument.” Id. at 989. 
 48. Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 851-52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1963-64) 
(“Reason to known” means that “the actor has information from which a person of reasonable 
intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor would infer that the fact in question exists, or 
that such person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact exists.”).  
 With this standard, Justice O’Connor’s majority asserts that it does not adopt what Justice White’s 
concurring opinion calls a “watered down” version of contributory liability. Inwood III, at 854 n.13, 
859. In his concurrence, Justice White argues that the majority “silently acquiesce[s]” to a standard 
ostensibly adopted by the court of appeals in Inwood II (638 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1981)) when, in reality, 
the appellate court erroneously dismissed the district court’s factual findings in Ives Labs., Inc. v. 
Darby Drug Co. (“Inwood I”) (455 F. Supp. 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d Ives Labs., Inc. v. Darby Drug 
Co., 601 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1979)) and inappropriately expanded the doctrine of contributory 
infringement allowable under § 32 of the Lanham Act. Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 859-60 (White, J., 
concurring).  
 See also Inwood II, 638 F.2d at 543 (failing to “reasonably anticipate” illegal substitution 
constitutes contributory infringement); Inwood I, 455 F. Supp. at 939 (setting forth the governing legal 
principles used in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Inwood III).  
 Justice White opines that mere anticipation that some level of infringement may occur down the 
line by an unknown retailer “should not by itself be a predicate for contributory liability.” Inwood III, 
456 U.S. at 861 (emphasis added) (citing 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 25:2 (1973)). Justice White stamps his concurrence with a careful nod to the general policies guiding 
contributory infringement law: disable the passing or palming off of another’s goods, discourage 
unfair competition and protect consumers. Id. at 861. See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1187-88 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (where the court suggests that, in addition to 
policy concerns such as consumer deception, false designation of origin and misappropriation of 
goodwill, infringement of a mark “by unauthorized users can lead to the public’s belief that the mark’s 
owner sponsors or otherwise approves of the use of the trademark”).  
 Justice O’Connor distinguishes her opinion from Justice White’s concern in his concurring 
opinion that the appellate court relied on a weak standard whereby drug manufacturers could be found 
contributorily liable if they “could reasonably anticipate” illegal drug substitution further down the 
chain. Id. at 854 n.13 (quoting Inwood II, 638 F.2d at 543). Instead, Justice O’Connor posits that the 
appellate court only used that language to “buttress [its] conclusion that the legal test for contributory 
infringement . . . had been met.” Id.  
 Due to the ultimate similarity between Justice White’s and the majority’s goals, it follows that 
Justice White’s arguments can be reconciled with the majority by finding contributory infringement 
only in cases where an actor proceeds intentionally when he knows or has reason to know that 
trademark infringement may occur down the line, rather than merely requiring the actor to anticipate 
unforeseeable future infringement. 
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legislative goals of the Lanham Act by trading on another’s goodwill49 and 
robbing consumers of the capacity to discern competing goods.50  
As the doctrine of contributory infringement has gained a following 
post-Inwood III, courts have successfully interpreted the decision to justify 
imposition of liability in settings other than manufacturer-distributor, 
including landlord-tenant.51 This application marks a powerful extension 
of contributory infringement liability beyond the scope anticipated by the 
Supreme Court in Inwood III.52 Finding liability for contributory 
infringement in this setting requires a critical analysis of the defendant’s 
relationship to the goods being advertised and sold on the defendant’s 
premises.53 Thus, the defendant will be contributorily liable for the 
trademark infringement of a third party if he knows or has reason to know 
of such violations, even though the defendant may lack actual knowledge 
of the sales of counterfeit goods.54 In spite of the Seventh Circuit’s 
objective to broaden the scope of contributory trademark infringement in 
its Hard Rock Cafe v. Concession Services, Inc. decision, the court was 
 
 
 49. Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 854 n.14 (citing S. REP. NO. 1333 (1946). 
 50. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 944 (1939)).  
 51. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 
1992) (holding that Inwoood III applied to the owner of flea markets); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (“a swap meet can not disregard its vendors’ blatant 
trademark infringements with impunity”). See also Brian D. Kaiser, Contributory Trademark 
Infringement by Internet Service Providers: An Argument for Limitation, 7 SPG J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 
4, *18 (2002) (asserting that Hard Rock represents an extension of the Inwood doctrine).  
 52. In its unprecedented holding, the Seventh Circuit found reason to apply the Inwood III test to 
the landlord setting if it could affirmatively conclude that the operator of a flea market is akin to a 
manufacturer of a mislabeled good, for example, the drug manufacturers in the Inwood cases. Hard 
Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148. Additionally, in applying Hard Rock, the 9th Circuit found that “Inwood . . . 
laid down no limiting principle that would require defendant to be a manufacturer or distributor.” 
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265.  
 53. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1148-49. Contrary to the arguments advanced by both sides, the court 
found it ultimately irrelevant whether the defendant’s relationship to the actual infringer is that of 
landlord or licensor. Id. The court noted that the defendant is “responsible for the torts of those it 
permits on its premises ‘knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act 
tortiously’” and concluded that common law “imposes the same duty on landlords and licensors that 
the Supreme Court has imposed on manufacturers and distributors.” Id. at 1149 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c), cmt. d (1979)). 
 54. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1149. The court predicated its finding of actual knowledge on the 
establishment of “willful blindness” by the district court, holding that willful blindness “is a sufficient 
basis for a finding of violation of the Lanham Act.” Id. at 1148 (quoting Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 
875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989)). In Lee, the court suggested that a failure to investigate probable 
trademark infringement for fear of what such an investigation may reveal constitutes willful blindness. 
Lee, 875 F.2d at 590. The Hard Rock court did distinguish “willful blindness” from “reason to know” 
by emphasizing that “willful blindness” requires a subjective analysis of what that particular defendant 
knew whereas “reason to know” objectively queries whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
defendant’s position would have suspected counterfeiting. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1151.  
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careful to exclude mere negligence from the prevailing standard.55 
Moreover, the court found that a potential defendant in a contributory 
infringement action has no affirmative duty to prevent counterfeiting, 
concluding that the “reason to know” standard advanced in Inwood III 
requires a landlord, licensor or any attached agents to “understand what a 
reasonably prudent person would understand,” but in no sense does it 
“impose any duty to seek out and prevent violations.”56 In the second part 
of its opinion, the Seventh Circuit considered the potential for joint 
tortfeasor liability for trademark infringement57 and vicarious liability 
under copyright law.58  
 
 
 55. 955 F.2d at 1151 (vacating Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Parvez, No. 89 C 6966, 1990 
WL 139141 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). 
 56. Id. at 1149 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1), cmt. a (1965)).  
 57. Id. at 1150. See also David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 310-11 (7th 
Cir. 1989). In David Berg, the Seventh Circuit held that a meat distributor could not be found liable for 
contributory infringement when he lacked the requisite intent and knowledge of wrongful activities 
further down the line. Id. at 311 (citing Inwood III, 456 U.S. at 853-54). The court also held that the 
distributor could not be found liable for infringement on a joint-tortfeasor theory due to lack of 
partnership. Id. The Seventh Circuit found that joint tortfeasor liability exists in trademark 
infringement and unfair competition actions, noting that “[e]very person actively partaking in, lending 
aid to, or ratifying and adopting such acts is liable equally with the party itself performing these acts.” 
Id. (citing Smithkline Beckman Corp. v. Pennex Products Co., 103 F.R.D. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1984)). 
Although the Seventh Circuit does not explicitly define a partnership for joint tortfeasor liability, the 
court does establish factors relevant to the partnership inquiry: evidence of an agreement; any acts 
whereby two separate entities hold themselves out to the public as partners; authority on one to bind 
the other in transactions with a third party; or the exercise of joint ownership or control over products 
to be distributed. Id. On the facts of this case, the court did not find any evidence of a partnership 
agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, either tacit or express. Id.  
 58. Due to the factual limitations of the Hard Rock case, the court could not find any application 
of joint tortfeasor liability but considered the more expansive theory of vicarious liability under 
copyright law at the behest of the petitioner. 955 F.2d at 1150. See generally Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. 
v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that in spite of lack of intent, a defendant 
is vicariously liable for copyright infringement “[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with 
an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials”); Gershwin Publ’g 
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding defendant vicariously 
liable for copyright infringement when he benefited financially and when he “with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induce[d], cause[d] or materially contribute[d] to the infringing conduct of 
another”).  
 The Hard Rock court refused to apply the expansive copyright doctrine, finding that trademark 
law requires much more narrow rules than copyright law could possibly provide. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d 
at 1150 (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). See Sony Corp., 464 
U.S. at 439 n.19 (declaring that copyright and trademark are not naturally “identical twins, and [the 
Court] exercise[s] the caution which [the Court] ha[s] expressed in the past in applying doctrine 
formulated in one area to the other”). However, in language auxiliary to the Hard Rock decision, the 
court did actually consider copyright principles, finding that they supported the defendant on the facts 
of the case. Hard Rock, 955 F.2d at 1150 n.4. In particular, the Court drew authority from copyright 
decisions that focused on the direct financial benefit the defendant may have derived from the alleged 
infringement. Id. (citing Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 
(7th Cir. 1929)) (finding defendant did not hire the alleged infringer for entertainment purposes); 
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding defendant did 
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The most contemporary extension of the Inwood contributory 
infringement theory to engage this objectively reasonable test has moved 
from the physical landlord/tenant setting to the Internet-based Domain 
Name registrar/website operator setting.59 Citing the traditional Inwood III 
test60 and finding that the domain name registrar clearly did not 
intentionally induce another to infringe a trademark, the Lockheed court 
focused on the knowledge prong of the test: whether the registrar (NSI) 
continued to supply its product with knowledge that another was using it 
for purposes of trademark infringement.61 The court relied on its holding 
that, because the published list is not the instrument for direct trademark 
infringement,62 it cannot be the instrument for contributory trademark 
infringement.63 First, the court suggested that because NSI did not exert 
enough control over the content of the domain pages it listed, it would be 
unreasonable to expect NSI to monitor the entire Internet for infringing 
activity.64 Second, the court found that NSI’s relationship to the potentially 
infringing use of the domain name was too remote to find the requisite 
knowledge under the Inwood III test.65 Most importantly, the court refused 
to extend the doctrine of contributory liability to a situation where there 
 
 
not take a percentage of the alleged infringer’s sales); Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1161 (finding defendant 
took no percentage of the alleged infringer’s performance fees)).  
 59. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The 
Lockheed court provides a relevant history of the contributory trademark infringement test. Id. at 960. 
Noting that all instances of contributory infringement are fact-specific, the court cited the evolution of 
the doctrine over time: the manufacturer/distributor setting (Inwood III, supra notes 42-44 and 
accompanying text); the landlord/tenant setting (Hard Rock and Fonovisa, supra notes 51-52 and 
accompanying text); the franchisor/franchisee setting (Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., 
Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1992); and, here to there, the domain name registrar/registrant 
setting. Id. at 961. 
 60. See supra notes 43, 54 and accompanying text. 
 61. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 960. 
 62. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 63. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 961 (“[Network Solutions] is involved only in the registration of 
domain names, not in the use of domain names in connection with goods and services on the 
Internet”). 
 64. Id. at 961-62. The court distinguished its holding from Hard Rock and Fonovisa, noting that 
“[w]hile the landlord of a flea market might reasonably be expected to monitor the merchandise sold 
on his premises” it would be unreasonable to require the same of a domain name registrar. Id. at 962. 
There are a variety of factors influencing Network Solution’s lack of control over the content of the 
Internet, including the lack of a centralized storage location or communications channel for the 
Internet and the technical infeasibility of accessing all of the information shared over the Internet. Id. 
(quoting American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 
aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)). See also Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“courts 
must consider the extent of control exercised by a defendant over a third-party’s means of 
infringement” when considering the knowledge prong of the contributory infringement test). The 
Perfect 10 court required “direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to 
infringe the plaintiff’s mark” in order to infer contributory liability by the defendant publisher. Id.  
 65. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962-63.  
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was no certainty that actual trademark infringement even occurred.66 The 
court concluded that the lack of an affirmative duty to police the Internet 
for potentially infringing behavior precluded a finding of contributory 
liability.67
B. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 
An example of a state tort claim that can bring further life to a 
trademark infringement action is that of “intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage.” Establishing this claim requires the 
plaintiff to show a prima facie case of: (1) the existence of a specific 
prospective economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third 
party with a probability of future economic benefit; (2) the defendant’s 
knowledge of the probability of such a future economic relationship; (3) 
the defendant’s intentional acts to disturb that relationship; (4) proof of 
actual interference with that relationship; and (5) damages the defendant’s 
international acts proximately caused.68 In the Internet arena, the guiding 
doctrine has not changed, but its application has become more focused on 
the prior relationship that the potential plaintiff had with any third parties 
who did not consummate commercial dealings with the plaintiff due to the 
defendant’s behavior.69 When there is no evidence of any “reasonable 
 
 
 66. Id. at 965. The court opined that a finding of contributory infringement would “require the 
Court to impute knowledge of infringement to NSI in circumstances where the use of the term . . . in a 
domain name may or may not be infringing.” Id. The court suggested that any finding of contributory 
liability against NSI would improperly extend Lockheed’s “right[s] in gross to control all uses of [the 
term] in domain names.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 967. 
 68. See Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1305 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“establish[] 
a specific economic relationship containing the probability of future economic benefit between it and 
any customer or prospective customer”); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 
1280 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (plaintiff’s cause of action is contingent on “circumstances indicat[ing] unfair 
competition or an unprivileged interference with prospective advantage”); Seidl v. Greentree Mortgage 
Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1302 (D. Col. 1998) (“a protected relationship exists only if there is a 
reasonable likelihood or probability that a contract would have resulted; there must be something 
beyond a mere hope”) (citing Tose v. First Penn. Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 898 (3d Cir. 1981)); SNA, Inc. 
v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D. Penn. 1999) (holding there must be a reasonable probability of 
prospective relations with an anticipated customer); Palmer v. Gotta Have it Golf Collectibles, Inc., 
106 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding an action of this nature requires a “business 
relationship evidenced by an actual and identifiable understanding or agreement which in all 
probability would have been completed if the defendant had not interfered”) (quoting Ethan Allen, Inc. 
v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 815 (Fla. 1994)); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Russolillo, 128 F. 
Supp. 2d 630, 636-37 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (requiring evidence of defendant’s wrongful conduct to be 
objectively based to prove intentional interference). 
 69. See, e.g., Seidl, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. The registrant of an Internet domain name who 
brought suit alleging that the defendant had used his domain name as an email identifier failed to 
establish the requisite prior relationship with those targeted from the defendant’s allegedly tortious 
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probability that a contract will be realized with [a] hypothetical internet 
user,” there is no prima facie case for this tort.70 Courts have steadfastly 
embraced the notion that a plaintiff will not be successful on this claim if 
he only has a “mere hope” of some future business relations with a 
prospective third party.71  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Direct Trademark Infringement 
Search engines are not the vehicles for direct trademark infringement 
and therefore should not be held liable for publishing potentially 
infringing results nor for the initial interest confusion resulting from those 
listings.72 Notably, a search engine’s results are not the “instrument or 
forum for infringement.”73 Further, even under a lenient standard that 
would impose infringement on a publisher,74 a search engine would still 
have to be on notice as to the infringing nature of the published material.75 
Body Solutions’ best chance of success in this case would require a 
showing that the targeted search engines were on notice as to the nature of 
all of the posted material generated by search results.76 However, because 
 
 
email correspondence. Id. 
 70. SNA, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d at 568.  
 71. See, e.g., Seidl, 30 F. Supp. at 1302; Fredrick v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 144 F.3d 500, 505 
(7th Cir. 1998) (“mere hope of obtaining employment is not a protected expectancy”); First Health 
Group Corp. v. Nat’l Prescription Adm’rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194, 232 (M.D. Pa. 2001) 
(“something less than a contractual right, [but] something more than a mere hope . . .”) (quoting 
Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (1979)); In re Baseball Bat Antitrust Litig., 
75 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1203 (D. Kan. 1999) (requiring an allegation of more than “mere hope for a 
future business opportunity or the innate optimism of the salesman”). 
 72. An infringer is innocent if he is engaged solely in the business of printing the mark for 
others.” See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(2)(A) (1946) (amended 1988).  
 73. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. A search engine such as Yahoo! does not 
directly connect users to an infringing file, “but rather to a website that provides the infringing file, 
thus adding an extra step.” Aric Jacover, Note, I Want My MP3! Creating a Legal and Practical 
Scheme to Combat Copyright Infringement on Peer-to-Peer Internet Applications, 90 GEO. L.J. 2207, 
2242 n.197 (2002).  
 74. See generally supra note 17, Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. R.M. Pest, Inc., 8 U.S.P.G.2d 
1614 (where Ameritech Yellow Pages was found not to be an innocent publisher when it printed an 
advertisement generated by an infringing company). 
 75. NBA Properties Untertainment Records LLC, No. 99 Civ. 2933 (H.B), 1999 WL 335146 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), at *14 (citing Century 21 for the proposition that “actual notice” is required to 
overcome the innocent publisher defense). Generally, this cause of action will be brought as part of a 
contributory infringement claim rather than a direct trademark infringement claim. For an explanation 
of the contributory infringement hypothesis and analysis, see supra §§ II(A)(b) and III(B).  
 76. This rubric does not satisfy the position posited (and rarely questioned) in the Lockhead 
court, that a registrar cannot be held liable for trademark infringement because its involvement is 
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the language of the Lanham Act regarding printer liability expressly 
requires use “in connection with the sale,”77 Body Solutions may have 
some success by proving that the search engine stands to gain some 
pecuniary benefit by including the infringing listings in its search results 
pages.78 Moreover, under the New Kids test, search engines would have a 
viable fair-use defense because use of the trademarked term in search 
results is necessary to describe a class of goods for comparison or 
reference purposes.79 Finding search engine liability in this context would 
adversely allow trademark owners to appropriate words from the English 
language and exert property rights over phrases that are otherwise 
necessary for descriptive purposes, thus unnecessarily chilling the open 
marketplace for which the Internet has long been lauded.80
Additionally, search engines should not be held liable for trademark 
infringement stemming from the metatags of the websites that they list.81 It 
is unclear that a search engine has the bad faith necessary to augment 
likelihood of confusion analysis two-degrees separated from the actual 
infringement.82 At best, Body Solutions could proffer the contract between 
the search engine and website operator for its pay-for-placement 
arrangement in order to argue that the search engine should be held liable 
for content on a website that it should have been monitoring according to 
the contract.83
 
 
confined to registration rather than use of the infringing name in the sale of goods or services. 985 F. 
Supp. at 949. Cf. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that an Internet Service Provider (ISP) was liable for infringing material posted on a site that 
it hosted).  
 77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(A) (1946) (amended 1988).  
 78. Consider the implications for a search engine operator who is not only aware of his potential 
to deceive users but actually enters into a contract which sets the stage for such deception. See 
generally Anne Keaty, Roger J. Johns, & Lucy L. Henke, Can Internet Service Providers and Other 
Secondary Parties be Held Liable for Deceptive Online Advertising?, 58 BUS. LAW. 469, 516 (2002). 
Generally, this analysis will still fall under the contributory infringement standards in § III(B). 
 79. 971 F.2d at 302 (9th Cir. 1992); see supra note 19. This kind of use qualifies as nominative, 
because the search engines are not using the “trademarks qua trademarks.” Playboy Enters. v. Excite, 
2000 WL 1308815; see supra note 20. See also Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“nominative use” of a trademarked term is justified when it is necessary to effectively describe 
a product or service “without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases”) (quoting Welles I, 78 F. 
Supp. 2d 1066, 1079 (S.D. Cal. 1999)); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing in the copyright context, a fair-use defense for a search engine sued for displaying 
thumbnail images in its search results).  
 80. See supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text. See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 
870, 880, 885 (1997) (describing the Internet as a “vast democratic forum” which has created a “new 
marketplace of ideas” benefiting the diversity of all human thought).  
 81. See supra notes 3 and 22.  
 82. See generally supra note 22, New York State Soc’y of Certified Pub. Accounts v. Eric Louis 
Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
 83. This notion is more applicable in the contributory infringement context. See infra note 94 and 
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Body Solutions will claim that a search engine is liable for direct 
trademark infringement by asserting that the search engine is directly 
responsible for initial interest confusion.84 This argument will fail because 
search engines have no intent to divert consumers from finding what they 
were looking for under the prevailing Brookfield analysis.85 However, if 
the court measured a search engine’s intent by the amount of profit it gains 
from using a trademarked term,86 it would be possible to infer intent from 
the money a search engine makes on a cost-per-click system.87 It is 
unlikely this theory would sway a court, due to the flexibility of Internet 
searching, as opposed to the more rigid structure posed in the Brookfield 
hypothetical.88 Most importantly, simply displaying results to a query is 
not the instrument for trademark infringement in the sale of goods or 
services.89 To that end, the real locus of liability should fall within the 
domain of contributory, rather than direct, trademark infringement.  
B. Contributory Trademark Infringement 
When a search engine sells a trademarked search term to one whom it 
knows will use the term in an infringing manner, the search engine should 
 
 
accompanying text. For a search engine to be found directly liable for trademark infringement, see the 
Sleekcraft test, supra note 15. 
 84. See supra note 24 (discussing “initial interest confusion”). 
 85. 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 86. See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981); see supra note 26. 
Specifically, according to the Overture Terms and Conditions for its pay-for-placement program, an 
advertising website pays based on the number of clicks on his listings multiplied by the cost of each 
listing. Overture–Advertiser Terms and Conditions, at http://www.overture.com/d/Usm/about/ 
advertisers/terms.jhtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).  
 87. Although this model is a less tenable mode of finding liability, it does pose an interesting 
theory. Considering the nature of the pay-for-placement economic model on search engines, see supra 
note 5, a search engine stands to make a great deal of money if a website operator pays it for every 
“click” of the website’s link that the search results generate. That is, if a user inputs “body solutions” 
into the query box and, due to a pay-for-placement contract with a search engine, a competitor comes 
up ahead of the actual website bearing the Body Solutions trademark on the results page, the search 
engine may have contributed to the infringing conduct. As a matter of direct liability, if the search 
engine intended to profit by posting the results in that manner, which it would have if it negotiated a 
pay-per-click contract with a competitor for the term “body solutions,” then a search engine would 
have the intent necessary to find responsibility for causing initial interest confusion, thereby imputing 
liability for trademark infringement.  
 88. For the Brookfield hypothetical involving a real-life highway, see supra note 30. As the court 
in Bihari found, the simplicity of Internet searching enables a user to rectify the initial interest 
confusion with just “one click of the mouse and a few seconds delay.” 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 89. To that end, search engines are similar to Lockhead, supra note 17. See also supra note 73 
(where Jacover suggests that an “extra step” is necessary to graft liability for trademark infringement 
onto a search engine).  
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be held liable for contributory trademark infringement.90 First, a search 
engine would “know or ha[ve] reason to know”91 of infringing conduct by 
those with whom it contracts if the contract specifies that the search engine 
maintain responsibility for monitoring the content of the listings on its 
site.92 Responsibility for maintaining the advertising program which 
supports the infringing use would satisfy the knowledge test set forth in 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., that the “other will or can 
reasonably be expected to commit a tort with the supplied instrument.”93 
In this case, the pay-for-placement model is the direct instrument that 
might facilitate a cunning website operator’s deviant attempt to lure 
consumers away from trademarked sites by enabling him to buy those 
trademarked terms from the search engine.94  
Search engines take courts beyond the established doctrines of 
contributory liability to-date.95 Because the Inwood III decision set forth 
no limiting principle on the doctrine,96 courts can further advance the 
theory to account for the contributions to trademark infringement made in 
the search engine/advertiser context.97 Further, under the Restatement, the 
domain of a search engine may constitute “premises” sufficient to expect 
responsibility for those who engage in tortious conduct, i.e. infringement 
at common law.98 However, because mere negligence is not enough to 
impose liability and the search engine has no affirmative duty to prevent 
infringement,99 it is crucial to consider the search engine’s relationship to 
 
 
 90. Consider the dicta suggested in Nissan II, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 91. This is the basic contributory infringement test proffered by the court in Inwood III, 456 U.S. 
844, 854 (1982), supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.  
 92. Specifically, the Google contract holds the advertising party responsible for the selection of 
its AdWords and for the content of the advertisements. However, Google retains the right to review, 
reject, modify or remove any advertisement on its site consistent with its stated policy objectives. 
Google Adwords: Terms and Conditions, at http://adwords.google.com/select/TranslatedTermsAnd 
Conditions.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). Those stated policies include adherence to intellectual 
property laws, including removing or disabling potentially infringing activity on its site. See Google: 
Intellectual Property Policy, at http://www.google.com/dmca.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2003).  
 93. 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (Mass. 1946 (citation omitted), supra note 46 and accompanying text.  
 94. See, e.g., supra notes 38, 41 and accompanying text.  
 95. Consider the evolution of the contributory infringement doctrine, beginning with 
manufacturer-distributor relationships in Inwood III, supra notes 42, 44, 47-49, graduating to the 
landlord-tenant relationship in Hard Rock and Fonovisa, supra notes 51-53, and, most recently, the 
domain name/registrar context in Lockhead, supra notes 59-67.  
 96. Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 97. Generally considering the evolution of this doctrine (supra note 95) and the lack of any 
concrete limiting language (supra note 97), it may be a logical extension for courts to apply the same 
theory to the search engine/advertiser setting.  
 98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c), cmt. d. 
 99. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1151, supra note 
56.  
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the goods being distributed via its advertising services.100 If Body 
Solutions can demonstrate that the nature of a search engine’s contract 
with an infringing advertiser is such that the search engine retains editorial 
privilege,101 a court may impute liability based on a standard of reasonable 
expectation.102
It is unlikely that a court will find that a search engine is liable for 
trademark infringement under the joint partnership theory.103 That is, 
without evidence of a partnership, or an agreement whereby the search 
engine and the website operator hold themselves out to the public as 
partners or have the authority to bind one another in control or ownership 
of products to be distributed, there is no joint enterprise.104 In the Google 
and Overture contracts, the authority of a search engine to bind a website 
operator has not been commercially geared toward the website’s product, 
but rather attached to the content provided by the website to the search 
engine, indicating no evidence of joint partnership.105  
With no imposition on search engines to affirmatively prevent 
trademark infringement from occurring on its Partner sites, the doctrine of 
contributory liability is ambiguous in its power over this Internet-specific 
situation.106 However, because the relationship between a search engine 
and a website operator that advertises on the search engine’s website (a 
“partner”) is far more direct than the relationship between a search engine 
and website operators generally, it is possible that a search engine acts 
with the requisite knowledge under the Inwood III test.107
 
 
 100. Consider the Hard Rock analysis that “actual knowledge” of the sale of counterfeit goods, as 
well as understanding what a “reasonably prudent person” would understand, are essential to a finding 
of contributory liability. Id. See supra note 54. 
 101. Danny Sullivan, GoTo Speaks Out on FTC Complaint, at http://www.searchenginewatch. 
com/sereport/article.php/2164131 (Sept. 4, 2001) (copy on file with author). Sullivan posits that in a 
pay-for-placement system, “there is a supposition of editorial criteria, one that the search engines who 
wish to position themselves as more than web Yellow Pages are supposed to protect.” Id. 
 102. Consider the rules set forth by Hard Rock and Fonovisa, supra notes 51-58 and 
accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.  
 104. David Berg Co. v. Gatto Int’l Trading Co., 884 F.3d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 105. See generally Google Adwords: Terms and Conditions, p1, supra note 92. The Google 
agreement specifically limits the contract with its partners (or those websites owned by a third party 
with which Google has agreed to place AdWords Select ads) to the placement of advertisements 
through its program. Id. 
 106. In a landmark Internet infringement case, Lockheed Martin v. Networking Solutions, Inc., the 
court found that it is unreasonable to expect a domain name registrar to police the entire Internet for 
potentially infringing behavior. 985 F. Supp. 949, 962 (C.D. Cal. 1997), supra note 66 and 
accompanying text.  
 107. The Lockheed court found that relationship between a registrar and website operator was too 
remote to impose contributory infringement liability. Id. A major distinguishing factor in these two 
cases may be that registration of domain names with NSI was free, whereas the relationship between a 
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C. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 
Because it is unlikely that an Internet plaintiff can prove a likelihood of 
potential business relationships with consumers who might be deterred 
through improper publishing of the plaintiff’s trademark, a search engine 
will not be held liable for tortious interference with prospective economic 
advantage. Of the five-pronged test promulgated by courts in this tort 
action,108 Body Solutions would fail to satisfy the initial requirement of 
proving a “specific prospective economic relationship” endemic to the 
claim and thus would be unable to move forward with any of the other 
parts of the test.109  
IV. PROPOSAL  
Body Solutions’ most viable claim will be that a search engine should 
be held liable for contributory infringement of its trademark. For success 
on the merits of this claim, Body Solutions will most likely satisfy the 
second prong of the Inwood III test, that the search engine “knows or has 
reason to know” that it is engaging in trademark infringement.110 Body 
Solutions will evidence this knowledge by showing that (1) the search 
engine controlled the premises facilitating an advertiser’s unlawful use of 
Body Solutions’ trademark;111 (2) the search engine failed to understand 
what a reasonably prudent person would have understood in the same 
situation;112 and (3) the search engine exerted enough control over the 
content of its search results to prevent such infringement.113
 
 
search engine and an advertiser/website operator is, by its very nature, pecuniary. 
 108. For a listing of the five-part test, see supra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 109. Based on the fluidity of the Internet and the ways in which users employ search engines, it is 
nearly impossible to prove (a) a specific commercial impact resulting from search results or (b) that 
any commercial impact could be precisely tied to the plaintiff as opposed to any other enterprise. It 
would not be viable to prove that a search engine intentionally disturbed a future economic 
relationship between a plaintiff and a search engine user because it is impossible to prove the 
probability that such a relationship even exists.  
 110. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra note 64 (giving an example of lack of control); supra note 101 (describing the 
level of control a search engine exercises in a pay-for-placement scheme). Consider also the pecuniary 
relationship between the search engine and the advertiser, suggesting a more direct controlling 
relationship. See supra note 86.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Pay-for-placement is an economic model that will allow search engines 
to remain viable in the midst of an otherwise anemic online advertising 
climate. However, pay-for-placement ushers in unlitigated issues in 
trademark infringement, including probable extension of the contributory 
infringement test. Companies such as Body Solutions will be most 
successful protecting their trademarks from infringement by diligent 
policing of the online community to ensure that search engines are not 
knowingly capitalizing by selling trademarks as keywords to companies in 
direct competition with the trademark holder.  
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